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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to a transfer from the Utah Supreme Court,
in accordance with Section 78-2-3 (4), Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended).

The Supreme Court of Utah has

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 78-22(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in applying the doctrine

of zoning estoppel?

This issue presents a question of law

and the trial court7s decision will be reviewed for
correctness.
1997).

Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678 (Utah

This issue was preserved in the City's Reply Brief

in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and in its
closing argument where objection was made to consideration
of the issue of estoppel.

See R. at 7, 14, 203; Transcript

of Trial at p. 183.
2.

Did the trial court err in finding that the City

is estopped from applying its zoning regulations to Hugoes'
use of their property?

This issue presents a mixed question

-1-

of fact and law and the trial court's decision will be
reviewed to determine if the trial court abused its
discretion.
1980).

Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah

This issue was preserved in the City' Reply Brief in

Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and in its
closing argument where objection was made to consideration
of the issue of estoppel.

See R. at 7, 14, 203; Transcript

of Trial at p. 183.
3.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Hugoes'

use of their property was permitted under the former Woods
Cross City Zoning Ordinance?

This issue presents a question

of law and the trial court's decision will be reviewed for
correctness.

Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797

(Utah App. 1992).

This issue was preserved for appeal in

the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and in the City's
closing argument.

See R. at 91, Transcript of Trial at p.

183.
4.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Hugoes

have a legal right to nonconforming use as a "transfer
company"?

This issue presents a question of law and the

Court will review the trial court's decision for

-2-

correctness.

Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797

(Utah App. 1992).

This issue was preserved for appeal in

the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and in the City's
closing argument.

See R. at 91, Transcript of Trial at p.

183.
A.

Is the Hugoes' use of their property

consistent with the prior uses maintained on the
property?

This issue presents a question of law and

the Court will review the trial court's decision for
correctness.

Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d

797 (Utah App. 1992).

This issue was preserved for

appeal in the City's closing argument.

See Transcript

of Trial at p. 177# et. seq..
B.

Were the Site Plan Regulations of the former

City Zoning Ordinance applicable to Hugoes' use of the
property?

This issue presents a question of law and

the Court will review the trial court's decision for
correctness.

Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d

797 (Utah App. 1992).

This issue was preserved for

appeal in the City's closing argument.
of Trial at p. 177/ et. seq.
-3-

See Transcript

5.

Do the Hugoes have a vested right to use their

property to park their trucks as a result of the fill permit
issued by the City?

This issue presents a question of law

and the Court will review the trial court's decision for
correctness.

Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307

(Utah 1997).

This issue was preserved for appeal in the

City's closing argument.

See Transcript of Trial at p. 177,

et. seq.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes and ordinances are determinative
of this appeal:
Section 10-9-103 (1) (k), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended):
(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that:
(i) legally existed before its current
zoning designation;
(ii) has been maintained continuously
since the time the zoning regulation
governing the land changed; and
(iii) because of subsequent zoning
changes, does not conform with the zoning
regulations that now govern the land.
Former Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance Section 11-18-9:
-4-

SITE PLAN, In any commercial or manufacturing zone,
and in all zones where construction of main
buildings or dwellings other than single-family
dwellings is proposed or involved, the location of
main and accessory buildings on the site and in
relation to one another, the traffic circulation
features within the site, the height and bulk of
buildings, the provision for off-street parking
space, the provision for driveways for ingress and
egress, and for the installation of curb, gutter
and/or sidewalk when not already in place along the
street bordering, and provision for other open space
on the site, and the display of signs shall be in
accordance with a site plan or plans or subsequent
amendment thereof, approved in any case by the
Planning Commission prior to issuance of a Building
or Land-Use Permit•
In approving site plans the
Planning Commission may act on a site plan submitted
to it or may act on its own initiative in proposing
and approving a site plan, including any conditions
or requirements designated or specified on or in
connection therewith.
A site plan shall include
landscaping, fences, and walls designed to further
the purposes of the regulations for commercial,
industrial, and residential zones with two or more
family dwelling units and such features shall be
provided and maintained as a condition of the
establishment and maintenance of any use to which
they are appurtenant. In considering any site plan
hereunder the Planning Commission shall endeavor to
assure safety and convenience of traffic movements
both within the area covered and in relation to
access streets, harmonious and beneficial relation
among the buildings and uses in the area covered,
and satisfactory and harmonious relation between
such area and contiguous land and buildings and
adjacent neighborhoods.
All persons required to file a site plan under the
provisions of this Section shall, at the time of the
filing thereof, pay to the City a fee of $10.00 per
-5-

acre, or any portion thereof, contained within the
area covered by the site plan, with a minimum fee of
$25.00, the same to cover part of the cost of
processing and reviewing said site plan; provided,
however, that said fee may be changed from time to
time by Resolution of the City Council.
Former Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance Title 11, Chapter
13.
This Chapter is set out in its entirety in the Appendix
to this Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was originally brought by the
Plaintiffs Damon and Debbie Hugoe and Hugoe Trucking as an
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

Hugoes

sought to prevent Woods Cross City from enforcing its zoning
ordinances to preclude the Hugoes' use of their property to
park trucks from their business, Hugoe Trucking.

Cross

Motions for Summary Judgment were filed and were denied.
The matter proceeded to trial, on the merits, on
February 12, 1997, in the Second Judicial District Court,
Farmington Department, in Davis County, State of Utah.

The

Honorable Rodney S. Page heard the evidence and issued a
written Trial Ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs.

Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment were entered.
-6-

Defendant then took this appeal from the trial court7s
Judgment•

FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs Damon and Debbie Hugoe and/or Hugoe

Trucking own property located within Woods Cross City, Davis
County, State of Utah.

Plaintiffs purchased the property,

(hereinafter the "Property") in or about June, 1991.

See R.

at 2.
2.

Prior to the Hugoes' purchase of the Property, it

was used by Clarence Newman who stored trailers used in his
insulation business.
3.

See Transcript of Trial at p. 19.

The Property was annexed into Woods Cross City in

December, 1988.

Prior to annexation, Hugoes' predecessor in

interest, Frank Branch, had conversations with then Woods
Cross City Mayor Gerald Argyle.

Mayor Argyle represented to

Branch that the annexation would not effect the use of the
property.
4.

See Transcript of Trial at pp. 7-11.
No predecessor in interest of Hugoes had ever

sought or received any form of land use approval from either

-7-

Davis County, or Woods Cross City.

See Transcript of Trial

at pp. 15, 21.
5.

Prior to purchasing the Property, Debbie Hugoe

went to the Woods Cross City offices to check the zoning of
the Property.

She obtained a copy of the Chapter of the

Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance relating to C-2 zoning,
the zoning classification of the Property at that time.

See

R. at 249, Transcript of Trial at p. 51.
6.

Shortly after purchasing the Property, Hugoes

began hauling fill onto the Property.

Sometime in late July

or early August, 1991, the Hugoes were informed by Woods
Cross City that they needed a fill permit to place fill on
the Property.
7.

See R. at 250

On August 12, 1991, Debbie Hugoe went to the Woods

Cross City offices to obtain a fill permit.

While there,

she spoke with Tim Stephens, the Woods Cross City Community
Development Director.
8.

See R. at 250

At that time, Woods Cross City had recently

adopted a fill permit ordinance.

The City did not yet have

formal policies and procedures relating to the Ordinance in
place, nor did they have preprinted fill permit forms.

-8-

Mr.

Stephens used a preprinted building permit form for the fill
permit for the Hugoes.

At that time, Mr. Stephens was aware

that the Hugoes owned and operated Hugoe Trucking, Inc.

See

R. at 250.
9.

The Trial Court found that Mr. Stephens did not

inform Debbie Hugoe at that time that site plan approval was
required before any use could be made of the property.

See

R. at 250, 251.
10. A fill permit was issued by Woods Cross City to
the Hugoes on August 13, 1991.

Hugoes completed the filling

of their property in the Spring, 1992.
11.

See R. at 251.

In early 1992, the Woods Cross City Council

adopted a new zoning ordinance which changed the zoning on
Hugoes' property and other property in the area to 1-1,
light industrial.
12.

See R. at 251, 252.

On March 27, 1992, Hugoes received a letter from

Woods Cross City informing them that the use of their
property for parking trucks was in violation of the new
Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance.

The letter gave Hugoes

until April 20, 1992, to cease that use of the property.
Hugoes refused to comply with that Order.

-9-

Numerous other

demands to cease that use of the property were made, and on
November 13, 1997, Woods Cross City informed Hugoes that if
they did not cease that use of their property, court action
would be initiated to force compliance with the City's
order.

As a result of that letter, the instant action was

filed by the Hugoes and trial ensued.

See R. at 252.

13. Hugoes have never made application for or received
conditional use approval or site plan approval from Woods
Cross City for the Property.

See Transcript of Trial at pp.

90, 91.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The facts presented at trial were legally insufficient
to support a finding of zoning estoppel.

The trial court's

determination that Tim Stephens, the Woods Cross Zoning
Administrator, had a duty to inform the Hugoes that the use
of their property was improper is incorrect as a matter of
law.

In addition, the trial court's decision that the City

is estopped from applying its zoning ordinances to prohibit
the Hugoes7 use of their property contravenes significant

-10-

policy considerations that underlie the law of nonconforming
uses and the law of zoning in general.
The trial court erred in this matter by applying the
doctrine of zoning estoppel to the Hugoes' claims.

The

legal issues presented and the facts of the case should have
been analyzed under the doctrine of vested rights, as
pleaded.

The theory of zoning estoppel was never pleaded

and the issue was not tried by consent of the parties.
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it
concluded that the Hugoes had a legally nonconforming use.
The trial court's conclusion that Hugoes were operating a
"transfer company" within the meaning of the Woods Cross
City Ordinances was incorrect.

Hugoes have never

established a business operation on the Property and their
use of the Property to park their trucks is not a use which
was authorized in the former C-2 commercial zone.
The Hugoes do not have a right to continue parking
large trucks on their property as a legal nonconforming use
on the Property.

Their use of the Property has never been

legally established, and therefore, is not a use that
"legally existed" before the 1992 zoning change.

-11-

Their use

is not consistent with the prior uses, and even if it were,
there was no evidence offered at trial to establish that the
former uses were legal.

Because their use represents a

change in use from the preceding occupant, the City's Site
Plan regulations were applicable to their use and the
failure to apply for and receive Site Plan approval
forecloses any claim that their use was legally established.
The trial court also concluded that the fill permit
granted to the Hugoes was sufficient to grant them vested
rights to the continued use of their Property to park their
trucks.

This conclusion is incorrect because the fill

permit granted to them does not commit the Property to any
particular use, and therefore, cannot form the basis of a
finding that they have vested rights under Utah law.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE CITY WAS ESTOPPED FROM
APPLYING ITS ZONING REGULATIONS TO HUGOE'S PROPERTY
In Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980), the
Utah Supreme Court outlined the prerequisites for invoking
the doctrine of zoning estoppel.
-12-

Pursuant to the test set

forth in Young, the City must have committed an act or
omission upon which the Hugoes could rely in good faith in
making substantial changes in position or in incurring
extensive expenses.

Additionally, the action must be clear,

definite and affirmative.

If an omission is alleged as the

basis of estoppel, the omission must be a negligent or a
culpable omission where the party failing to act was under a
duty to act.

Mere silence or inaction will not operate to

work an estoppel.

In addition, the Hugoes have a duty to

inquire and confer with the City regarding the uses of the
Property which would be permitted.

Utah County v. Young,

615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp.,
836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992).

Hugoes failed to sustain the

burden of proof required of them to prove estoppel and the
trial court erred in finding that the City was estopped from
applying its zoning regulations to Hugoes' use of the
Property.
The trial court determined that Tim Stephens, Woods
Cross City Community Development Director, had a duty to
inform the Hugoes that their use of the Property was
improper, and that his failure to comply with this duty was

-13-

negligent or culpable.

See R. at 23 9, 252.

This conclusion

is not supported by relevant law.
In Young, Utah County issued a building permit to the
Defendant under circumstances where the issuer of the permit
actually knew that Young intended to use the building in
violation of the zoning regulations at issue.

Despite this

knowledge, the Court found that estoppel was not
appropriate.
In Young, the Court cites the opinion in a case with
facts more egregious than those found by the trial court in
this matter.

In Maloof v. Gwinnett County, 200 S.E.2d 749,

231 Ga. 164 (1973), a Georgia court found that the county
was not estopped from applying its zoning regulations to
prohibit the owner's use of his property as a commercial dog
kennel when he had been given verbal permission by someone
in the City zoning office to build the kennel.

The court

reasoned:
[T]he appellants in the present case did not
receive a building permit authorizing them to
construct a commercial dog kennel. At the time
the kennel was built the zoning regulations of
Gwinnett County did not permit the operation of a
commercial dog kennel on their property, and they
would be presumed to know this fact. Since the
zoning regulations did not prohibit the
-14-

construction of a private kennel on the
appellants' property, the erection of the kennel
did not put the county authorities on notice that
the zoning regulation was being violated.
Id. at 751.
A similar result was reached in Jackson v. Kenai
Peninsula Borough, 733 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1987), a case which
cites the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in Young with
approval.

In Jackson, the Alaska Supreme Court found that

application of estoppel was not appropriate where the City
had issued a building permit to a landowner to build a
garage in a residential zone even though the City knew of
the landowner's commercial use of the property.
Additionally, the court noted that the City had been aware
of the landowner's use of the property for some 18 years
before bringing any enforcement action.
In reviewing the issues presented by the case, the
Court noted that "estoppel should be invoked against a
municipality in a zoning case *only in limited circumstances
and with great caution.'" Jackson 733 P.2d 1038, 1041
(quoting Town of Greenwich v. Kristoff, 481 A.2d 77, 81, 2
Conn.App. 515 (1984)).

The court further stated:

-15-

A number of substantive policy considerations
underlie this rule: (1) the defendant seeking to
invoke estoppel is under at least constructive
notice of the zoning ordinance he seeks to avoid;
(2) the purpose of zoning is to protect the public
interest and zoning regulations are drawn by
representation of the public will pursuant to the
political process; (3) a particular officer or
individual lacks authority to waive the public's
right to enforce its ordinance.
Jackson 733 P.2d at 1041 (quoting Wieck v. District of
Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 383 A.2d 7, 13 (D.C.App.
1978).
This Court has previously recognized these same policy
considerations, using strikingly similar language.

In Town

of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992),
the Defendant sought to prohibit the City from precluding
the Defendant's use of the property because the City had
previously issued business licenses for the use.

This Court

quoted from a previous decision of the Utah Supreme Court,
stating:
It would be unreasonable and unrealistic to
conclude that a clerk or a ministerial officer
having no authority to do so, could bind the
county to a variation of a zoning ordinance duly
passed, to which everyone has notice by its
passage and publication, because a ministerial
employee erred in characterizing the type of
property.

-16-

***

Similarly, the Alta town clerk's issuance in this
case of three lodging facility licenses does not
estop Alta from denying use of BHC's residence as
a lodging facility contrary to the Alta zoning
ordinance. Additionally, failure to enforce for a
time does not forfeit the power to enforce.
Id. at 803.
The trial court's legal conclusion in this matter that
Tim Stephens, the Woods Cross Community Development Director
"had a duty to act" is contrary to the law as set forth in
the cases noted above.

There was no proof offered at trial

that Mr. Stephens had any authority to grant land use
approval or to bind the City in any way.

In fact, the only

evidence on this point at trial was to the contrary.
Transcript of Trial at p.127.

See

Therefore, to the extent Mr.

Stephens did fail to inform Hugoes of the relevant
development requirements, such failure cannot form the basis
of "reasonable reliance" as required by the applicable law.
The trial court's decision on this point also
contravenes other significant legal policy implicit in the
decisions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court.

If

allowed to stand, the trial court's decision would render
local zoning law completely ineffective by allowing the
-17-

creation of nonconforming uses and vested rights by
prescription, through the inability of local government to
enforce its regulation against every violation.
Utah law places the duty of becoming familiar with all
the requirements of land development on the property owner.
The City cannot possibly bear the burden of informing every
landowner of the relevant development requirements relating
to their property.

While Hugoes offered testimony that they

reviewed the zoning requirements relative to the C-2 zone,
they offered no testimony that they reviewed the other
applicable regulations of the City relating to Land
Development and/or Site Plan approval.

Reviewing the Utah

Supreme Court's decision in Young, the Alaska Supreme Court
commented:
the Utah Court chose to place on the defendant the
burden of determining whether a zoning ordinance
applied to him in the absence of an affirmative
assertion by the zoning authority that it did not.
***

We agree with this approach. A business person in
Alaska must bear a number of administrative
burdens. He or she must obtain a business
license, file and pay appropriate taxes, and obey
all relevant laws. The burden of locating the
business in an appropriately zoned site must fall
on the business person.
-18-

Jackson 733 P.2d at 1042.

Similarly, it follows that if a

business owner must obey all relevant laws, they must obtain
all necessary approvals, including site plan approval, to
validly establish a business.

Hugoes offered no evidence to

the Court that they thus complied.

To the contrary, Debbie

Hugoe testified that they never sought any development
approval for the Property, save the issuance of a fill
permit.

See Transcript of Trial at pp. 90, 91.

The trial court found, as an essential element of the
estoppel analysis, that the City's "long-standing
acquiescence" to the alleged zoning violations on Hugoes'
property limited the necessity of Hugoes' inquiry into the
relevant zoning and land development requirements. See R at
253.

This conclusion is legally incorrect.
Utah Courts have repeatedly recognized that:
Zoning Ordinances are governmental acts which rest
upon the police power, and as to violations
thereof any inducements, reliances, negligence of
enforcement, or other like factors are merely
aggravations of the violation rather than excuses
or justifications therefor.
***

Ordinarily, a municipality is not precluded from
enforcing its zoning regulations, when its
officers have remained inactive in the face of
-19-

such violations. The promulgation of zoning
ordinances constitutes a governmental function.
This governmental power usually may not be
forfeited by the action of local officers in
disregard of the ordinance.
Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976);
Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981); Town of Alta
v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 803 (quoting 8A McQuillan
Municipal Corps. §25.349 (Rev. 1965)).
The trial court's legal conclusion in this regard
essentially establishes a right to acquire a non-conforming
use by prescription.
law.

This is completely contrary to Utah

The general rule which has been recognized by the

Courts of Utah makes it clear that a city cannot forfeit the
power to enforce its zoning ordinance by any past failure to
enforce, unless that failure is somehow discriminatory.
Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976);
Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981); Town of Alta
v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 803 (quoting 8A McQuillan
Municipal Corps. §25.349 (Rev. 1965)).
A contrary rule would prove disastrous for
municipalities and all local governments with limited
resources.

Testimony at trial indicated that Tim Stephens
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is a staff of one for the purposes of zoning enforcement in
Woods Cross City.

If the trial court's ruling were to

stand, countless zoning violations would result in the
establishment of nonconforming uses due to the lack of
enforcement.

Even in larger municipalities with full zoning

enforcement staffs, it is impossible to enforce regulations
against every violation.

The trial court's legal conclusion

in this regard places an extraordinary burden on
municipalities.

The law does not require municipalities to

bear such a burden.
It is also important to note that the trial court's
decision in this matter essentially allows the Hugoes to use
the Property free of any manner of local regulation.
Testimony at trial indicated that the Hugoes' business is
located in West Bountiful.

Therefore, there is no business

presence within Woods Cross for business licensing
regulation purposes.

The trial court determined that the

site plan regulations found within the City's zoning
ordinance were inapplicable.

The trial court's decision

also prohibits the City from enforcing any zoning
regulations that might be applicable to the Hugoes' use of
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the Property.

The result is that the City is left with

little or no regulatory authority to address land use issues
on the Property.
The trial court's legal conclusion regarding the
application of zoning estoppel is also contrary to general
policy considerations relating to zoning law and
nonconforming uses in particular.

Nonconforming uses are

disfavored and are excepted from the general rule that
zoning ordinances should be strictly construed in favor of
the property owner;

public policy encourages the

elimination of nonconforming uses because they detract from
the effectiveness of comprehensive land use regulations and
often result in lower property values and blight.

City of

Glendale v. Aldabbagh, 939 P.2d 418, 189 Ariz. 140 (Az.
1997); Lemon v. Speed, 694 So.2d 472, 96-858 La. App. 5th
Cir. (La. 1997).

Notwithstanding this rule of construction,

the trial court construed the City's zoning regulations
strictly against the City.

See R. at 243.

Additionally,

the trial court's interpretations of the City's Zoning
Regulations were legally incorrect.

Therefore, the trial

court's conclusion that the City was estopped from applying
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its zoning regulations to the Hugoes' use of their Property
is contrary to the stated policy of the law.

Accordingly,

the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and this
Court should enter judgment in favor of the City,

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE
DOCTRINE OF ZONING ESTOPPEL
It was procedural error for the trial court to have
considered the doctrine of estoppel.

The Complaint filed by

the Hugoes states two causes of action: (1) declaratory
relief, alleging that they have "vested rights" and a legal
nonconforming use for the current use of their Property; and
(2) injunctive relief, seeking to prevent the City from
prosecuting any criminal action against the Hugoes pending a
decision in this matter.

There is no cause of action or

claim for relief based on the doctrine of zoning estoppel.
The word "estoppel" does not appear anywhere in the
Complaint.

Notwithstanding the absence of a claim of

estoppel, the trial court based its ruling on a conclusion
that the City is estopped from enforcing its zoning
regulations to prohibit the Hugoes' use of their Property.
-23-

Woods Cross City did not consent to the court's
consideration of a claim of estoppel and consideration of
the issue by the trial court was fundamentally unfair to the
City.

Therefore, it was improper for the trial court to

base its decision on a legal theory that was not raised by
the pleadings.
A.

The Trial Court's Decision to Apply the Doctrine
of Estoppel was Legally Incorrect.

In its Trial Ruling, the trial court stated "[I]t
appears to the Court that the facts of [Western Land
Eguities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980)] do not
fit well with the facts of the present case."

R. at 233.

However, reference to the actual facts and this Court's
opinion in Western Land indicates to the contrary.
In Western Land, a proposed developer had submitted an
application and gone through a significant portion of the
required hearing process on a residential subdivision
application.

While the application was still in process,

the City attempted to enact a new zoning ordinance.

The

Court in Western Land chose to adopt a bright line rule for
determining when rights to develop under a particular zoning
ordinance vest, holding that

xx

an applicant is entitled to a
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building permit or subdivision approval if his proposed
development meets the zoning requirements in existence at
the time of his application and if he proceeds with
reasonable diligence, absent a countervailing public
interest."

Western Land, 617 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1980).

Hugoes' Complaint seeks relief under a claim of "vested
rights" as set forth in Western Land Equities.

The issue

raised by all the pleadings concerns the retroactive
application of a new zoning ordinance.

No claim of zoning

estoppel was ever raised until it became apparent, through
the process of Summary Judgment Motions, that the fill
permit obtained by Hugoes was not sufficient to vest any
rights to develop the Property other than those rights set
forth in the City's fill permit ordinance.
The trial court's Ruling also asserts that application
of Western Land would be inappropriate because Western Land
is primarily concerned with the vesting of rights in
instances where a zoning change is enacted before a use is
made of property.

However, as shown in Sections I and III

below, the trial court's conclusion that the Hugoes had
legally established the use of their Property prior to the
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zoning change is incorrect.

The Western Land property owner

had started preliminary preparations of the property for
development, similar to the Hugoes' filling and grading
their Property.

Therefore, the trial court's conclusion

that the facts of Western Land do not fit well with the
facts of this case is erroneous.
B.

Trial of the Issue of Estoppel Absent Notice to
the City and the City's Consent was Fundamentally
Unfair.

The Court's decision to imply a cause of action other
than that set forth within the Complaint violates
fundamental issues of fairness.

The City was not prepared

at trial to counter arguments made, based on evidence
applicable to other claims, regarding elements of
"reasonable reliance" and the significance of Hugoes'
expenditures.1

No discovery was taken on these issues.

1

In

Had notice been given to the City by way of
Amended Complaint, or otherwise, regarding the Court's
intent to analyze Hugoes' claims under the doctrine of
zoning estoppel, the City may well have chosen to present
evidence relating the significance of Hugoes' expenditures
and the reasonableness of their alleged reliance. The
record indicates that Hugoes used fill on their property
which was received from their work on City projects. No
evidence was adduced as to whether or not the Hugoes paid
for this fill, or whether they received it at a discounted
cost. Additionally, no evidence was adduced regarding how
much of the grading work was done by Hugoe trucks and what
-26-

summary, the conduct of the defense may well have been
significantly different if the City had been given any
notice of the manner in which the trial court would analyze
Hugoes' claims.

Therefore, the trial court's consideration

of a claim of estoppel was improper and was an abuse of
discretion.
C.

The City did not Consent to Trial of the Issue of
Estoppel.

Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure to so amend does
not affect the result of the trial of these
issues.
When evidence is introduced that is relevant to a pleaded
issue, and the party against whom the amendment is urged has
no reason to believe a new issue is being injected into the
case, that party cannot be said to have impliedly consented

value was placed on such work. Such evidence would have had
direct application to the trial court's determination of the
significance of the expenditures. No discovery was ever
conducted on these issues because they were not implicated
in the Complaint.
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to trial of that issue.

Keller v. Southwood North Medical

Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998), (quoting Domar
Ocean Transp. v. Independent Refining Co., 783 F.2d 1185
(5th Cir. 1986)) .
In this matter, there is no evidence that the City
consented to trial of the estoppel issue.
record demonstrates to the contrary.

In fact, the

The first appearance

of any claim of estoppel is a footnote in Hugoes' Response
to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment.

See R. at 7, 14.

The City objected to any consideration of the claim of
estoppel in its Brief in Reply.

See R. at 203.

Additionally, the City objected to any consideration of any
claim of estoppel in its closing argument.
of Trial, p. 183.2

See Transcript

Finally, all of the evidence submitted

to the trial court which is claimed to support the
application of estoppel is relevant to the Hugoes' initial
claim that the fill permit which was issued by the City gave
them approval to operate Hugoe Trucking, Inc. on the

2

It should be noted that while the record of this
matter prepared by the trial court does contain a copy of
the Transcript of Trial, that Transcript is not sequentially
stamped in accordance with the rest of the record.
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Property.

Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record

to suggest that the City ever consented to the trial of a
claim of estoppel.

Therefore, it was error for the trial

court to have considered a claim of estoppel, and the
judgment of the trial court should be reversed.

III.
HUGOES' USE OF THEIR PROPERTY IS NOT
A LEGALLY NONCONFORMING USE
Utah Law defines a nonconforming use as follows:
(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that:
(i) legally existed before its current
zoning designation;
(ii) has been maintained continuously
since the time the zoning regulation
governing the land changed; and
(iii) because of subsequent zoning
changes, does not conform with the zoning
regulations that now govern the land.
Section 10-9-103 (1) (k), Utah Code Annotated.
The trial court in this matter found that the Hugoes
were operating a "transfer company" within the meaning of
the former Woods Cross City zoning ordinance.
254.

See R. at

However, Hugoes' use of their Property was never
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"legally established," and therefore, cannot be a legally
nonconforming use.
Chapter 13 of the former City Zoning Ordinance
contained the regulations applicable to C-2 zoning, the
relevant zone classification for the Hugoe / s Property.
Section 11-13-1 established the use regulations of the zone
and set forth a detailed list of permitted and conditional
uses.

That Section stated:

In Commercial Zone C-2, no building or land shall
be used, and no building shall be erected which is
arranged, intended or designed to be used for
other than one or more of the following uses:
(Setting forth list of permitted and conditional
uses).
A copy of Chapter 13 of the former City Zoning Ordinance is
contained in the Appendix to this Brief.

Section 11-13-2,

immediately following the above-cited section, stated:
The above-specified stores, shops or businesses
shall be retail establishments and shall be
permitted only under the following conditions:
(Setting forth restrictions relating to the zone).
This language from the former ordinance makes it clear that
uses within this zone are retail-type businesses.

The

evidence offered at trial in this matter established that
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Hugoe Trucking is operated in West Bountiful.
transcript of Trial at p. 46, 85.

See

The property at issue in

this matter, located in Woods Cross, is used for the parking
of the Hugoe's trucks.

There was no testimony that Hugoes

conducted any business on the Property.

In fact, the

testimony from Debbie Hugoe was clear that when they
purchased the Property, they did so with the intention of
someday putting their office there.

See Transcript of Trial

at p. 48.
Hugoes use of the Property is not a commercial use
recognized by the former C-2 zoning regulations.

At best,

their use is an accessory use to a non-existent primary use.
Therefore, Hugoes use of the Property to park their trucks
was not permitted under the former zoning ordinance.

Thus,

the use was not legally established prior to the City's 1992
zoning change and therefore cannot be legally nonconforming.
In the alternative, assuming arguendo that Hugoe's use
of their Property could be properly characterized as a
"transfer company", that use never received proper land use
approval.

Therefore, the use was never legally established,
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and cannot form the basis of a finding that the Hugoes had a
nonconforming use.
A.

The Hucroe's Use of the Property is not Consistent
with the Previous Uses.

The trial court found that the Hugoe's use of the
Property was consistent with the previous uses of the
Property and therefore, the City site plan regulations were
inapplicable.

See R. at 238.

Those determinations were

erroneous, as a matter of law.
Testimony at trial established that the prior occupant
of the Property used it to store large trailers for his
insulation business.

See Transcript of Trial at p. 19.

Assuming the Hugoes are operating a "transfer company" on
the property as they have asserted and as the trial court
found, that use is obviously markedly different from the use
of the Property to store insulation trailers.3

Therefore,

the trial court's conclusion that Hugoe's use of the
Property was consistent with the previous uses is incorrect.

3

C h a p t e r 15 of the former City Zoning O r d i n a n c e
r e g u l a t e d u s e s w i t h i n the M a n u f a c t u r i n g Zone M - 2 .
A
p e r m i t t e d u s e in that zone w e r e E q u i p m e n t Y a r d s , contractors
y a r d and s t o r a g e .
Conditional U s e s included freight
t e r m i n a l s , r a i l w a y or truck.
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B.

The Site Plan Regulations of the Former Zoning
Ordinance Were Applicable to the Hucroe's Use,

Section 11-18-9 of the former Zoning Ordinance set
forth the Site Plan Regulations of the City.

That Section

read:
SITE PLAN. In any commercial or manufacturing zone,
and in all zones where construction of main
buildings or dwellings other than single-family
dwellings is proposed or involved, the location of
main and accessory buildings on the site and in
relation to one another, the traffic circulation
features within the site, the height and bulk of
buildings, the provision for off-street parking
space, the provision for driveways for ingress and
egress, and for the installation of curb, gutter
and/or sidewalk when not already in place along the
street bordering, and provision for other open space
on the site, and the display of signs shall be in
accordance with a site plan or plans or subsequent
amendment thereof, approved in any case by the
Planning Commission prior to issuance of a Building
or Land-Use Permit.
In approving site plans the
Planning Commission may act on a site plan submitted
to it or may act on its own initiative in proposing
and approving a site plan, including any conditions
or requirements designated or specified on or in
connection therewith.
A site plan shall include
landscaping, fences, and walls designed to further
the purposes of the regulations for commercial,
industrial, and residential zones with two or more
family dwelling units and such features shall be
provided and maintained as a condition of the
establishment and maintenance of any use to which
they are appurtenant. In considering any site plan
hereunder the Planning Commission shall endeavor to
assure safety and convenience of traffic movements
both within the area covered and in relation to
access streets, harmonious and beneficial relation
-33-

among the buildings and uses in the area covered,
and satisfactory and harmonious relation between
such area and contiguous land and buildings and
adjacent neighborhoods.
All persons required to file a site plan under the
provisions of this Section shall, at the time of the
filing thereof, pay to the City a fee of $10.00 per
acre, or any portion thereof, contained within the
area covered b the site plan, with a minimum fee of
$25.00, the same to cover part of the cost of
processing and reviewing said site plan; provided,
however, that said fee may be changed from time to
time by Resolution of the City Council.
The trial court interpreted this section in such a manner
that "a site plan is needed for construction purposes, that
change the character and use of the land, but not for
continued use of the land, by new owners, under a previously
allowable use."

See R. at 238.

As noted above, the trial

court's conclusion that the prior uses of the Property were
consistent with the Hugoe's use was incorrect.
The trial court apparently also interpreted the site
plan regulations to be applicable to commercially zoned
property only when a building was to be constructed.
at 238, Transcript of Trial at p. 178.

See R.

This interpretation

is also incorrect.
The first phrase of the ordinance (referring to
commercial or manufacturing zones) is clearly disjunctive
-34-

from the second phrase which refers to all zones where
"construction of main buildings or dwellings .•. is
proposed... ."

This construction of the ordinance is made

clear by the following provisions of the ordinance setting
forth the considerations of site plan approval.

Issues such

as traffic circulation, provisions for off-street parking,
and the display of signs are considerations that have no
necessary relation to the construction of buildings.

They

are however, critical to the proper design of commercial or
manufacturing areas.

These considerations allow

municipalities to appropriately plan for heavy traffic
patterns associated with commercial uses and heavy equipment
traffic associated with manufacturing uses.

From the

foregoing, it is apparent that the trial court
misinterpreted the site plan regulations.
The change in use of the Property, as demonstrated
above, initiated the City site plan regulations.

The

testimony at trial was clear that no site plan application
was ever filed.

Therefore, Hugoes never legally established

their use of the Property.
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IV.
HUGOES' DO NOT HAVE VESTED RIGHTS TO CONTINUE
THE USE OF THEIR PROPERTY
The trial court's Trial Ruling suggested that the fill
permit granted to the Hugoes was sufficient to validly
establish their use of the Property.

This conclusion is

completely contrary to the reasoning that underlies the
"vested rights" decision of the courts of this and other
states.

In Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d

388 (Utah 1980), the Court held that applicants for building
permits or subdivision approval have a right to expect that
the rules governing their applications will not be changed
mid-stream.

However, the case clearly recognizes that an

applicant must have committed its property to some
particular use that is consistent with the current
regulations.
While reviewing the general elements of a claim of
zoning estoppel, the Western Land court stated:
An additional requirement generally considered in
zoning estoppel cases is that of the existence of
some physical construction as an element of
substantial reliance. Preconstruction activities
such as the execution of architectural drawings or
the clearing of land and widening of roads are not
sufficient to create a vested right, nor generally
-36-

are activities that are not exclusively related to
the proposed project.
Western Land, 617 P.2d 388, 392.
In this matter, the fill permit granted to the Hugoes
did nothing to commit the Property to any particular use.
Additionally, their use of the Property, whether as a
"transfer company" or otherwise, was not consistent with the
zoning ordinance.

Accordingly, Hugoes do not have vested

rights to any use of the Property.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the City
requests that the judgment of the trial court be reversed
and that this Court direct the entry of a judgment holding
that the City is not estopped from applying its current
zoning regulations to preclude the Hugoes' use of their
Property as a parking or storage yard for their trucks and
that the Hugoes do not have any vested right to their
current use of the Property.
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DATED this

<a*^

day of January, 1999.
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C.

Todd J,

Attori
Woods Cross City

-38-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I caused two true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed first class,
postage prepaid, on this

day of January, 1999 to

the following:

Gregory M. Simonsen
Kirton & McConkie
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

-39-

A D D E N D U M

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDIClA&DISTRIC'
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
V \
L
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
\
Mil
DAMON HUGOE, DEBBIE HUGOE, and,
HUGOE TRUCKING, INC.,
a Utah corporation
Plaintiffs,

TRIAL RULING

v.
Case No. 960700425
WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal
corporation and political subdivision of the
State of Utah,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for trial to the Court on February 12, 1997. Plaintiffs
were represented by Gregory Simonsen and Bryan Booth. The defendant was represented by
Michael Hayes and Todd Godfrey. After the presentation of evidence and argument, the Court
took the case under advisement to prepare a written opinion. The Court rules as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiffs' property and that of Mr. Richard Fleming lie adjacent to one another on the
south side of 500 South at approximately 1300 West in Woods Cross City. 500 South is a major
East-West thoroughfare in the city.
Both parcels were previously owned by Mr. Frank Branch. In December of 1988 both
parcels were annexed into Woods Cross City.
Prior to December 1988 the property was located in the unincorporated area of Davis
County. Mr. Fleming purchased his parcel from Mr. Branch in 1985. He obtained permission

from Davis County to place a culvert in front of his property to allow better access and to haul in
fill. Much of the fill was hauled onto the property from Davis County retention basins as a result
of the 1983 flooding.
Mr. Fleming is in the construction business. Since he purchased the property in 1985, he
has used it continuously to park dump trucks, belly dumps and various other pieces of heavy
equipment.
Mr. Branch retained ownership of the parcel now owned by the plaintiff. Over the years
from at least 1985 until 1991, Mr. Branch allowed Mr. Clarence Newman to use the property.
Mr. Newman was in the insulation business and used the property to park semi-trucks and trailers
and large insulation trucks.
The use of the two parcels for truck and equipment parking was open and obvious and
clearly observable to anyone traveling on 500 South. The use continued from at least 1985 until
present.
In the year leading up to annexation of the property into Woods Cross City, Mr. Branch
and Mr. Fleming had several conversations with the then mayor, Mr. Argyle, and attended
several public meetings where they were encouraged to consent to annexation, with the assurance
that they would be able to continue the current use of their property. Ms. Hugoe also attended
some of these same meetings with her aunt, also a resident of the area.
Prior to June 1991 plaintiffs became interested in the property and Ms. Hugoe went to the
Woods Cross City offices to check the zoning of the property. She spoke with Mr. Stephens, the
Community Development Director. He gave her a copy of the zoning ordinance, which showed
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the property was in a C-2 zone. She noted that a permitted use in that zone was a "transfer
company."
Mr. Stephens had been employed as the Community Development Director for Woods
Cross City since 1989. Before that he worked in the planning department of Davis County. In
his position with Davis County he was familiar with the unincorporated area of the county.
Ms. Hugoe told Mr. Stephens that they were a trucking company. Trucks bearing the
Hugoe Trucking logo were often on the streets of Woods Cross City. Hugoe Trucking had been
used on several road construction jobs in the city hauling road base and "roto-mill" to and from
the road projects. Mr. Stephens was aware that the Hugoes were involved in a trucking business.
Ms. Hugoe inspected the property and the adjacent area and observed that the property
was being used for truck and equipment parking that seemed to be consistent with the zoning
use.
Plaintiffs purchased the property on June 11, 1991 and immediately began parking their
trucks on their property.
Shortly after purchase they began hauling fill onto the property, some of it from projects
they were working on in the city. A Scott Anderson from the city informed Ms. Hugoe that they
needed a fill permit to place fill on the property.
On August 12, 1991 Ms. Hugoe went to the Woods Cross City offices to get a fill permit.
She talked to Mr. Stephens; he informed her that the city had just adopted the fill ordinance and
they were still in the process of setting up policies and procedures. They did not have a fill
permit form yet so Mr. Stephens used a building permit form. They discussed the type of fill

3

they were using and that it was coming from city streets and other sources. He said it could not
contain wood or concrete. He was aware that they were a trucking company.
Ms. Hugoe testified that Mr. Stephens said nothing about plaintiffs not being able to use
the property for parking trucks or that they needed a site plan.
Mr. Stephens said he could not remember discussing that with her but conveniently
produced a memo to the file stating he told her that she needed a site plan and gave her a site
plan application.
The permit itself makes no mention of the site plan requirement or any particular use, and
the comment portion of the permit is blank. The fill permit was signed by Mr. Stephens on
August 13, 1991, the same date that the memo to the file bears.
Plaintiffs proceeded to complete the fill of the property hauling in approximately 100
truck loads of fill, which was topped by other materials to provide a smooth surface for the
parking of their trucks. The value of the fill and the work performed to grade it and finish it was
over $100,000.
All fill was completed by Spring of 1992. At all times after their purchase of the property
they continued to park trucks on their property. When the fill operation temporarily required
them to move their trucks they parked them on the Fleming property next door.
Use of the property by plaintiff to park trucks was consistent with other property uses in
the area. Use of the property in the area for commercial and industrial purposes has changed
very little over the years.
In the early part of 1992, Woods Cross City adopted a new zoning ordinance which
changed the zoning on plaintiffs' property and other property in the area to 1-1, light industrial.
4

On March 27, 1992, plaintiffs received a letter from Woods Cross City informing them
for the first time that the use of their property for parking trucks was in violation of the new
zoning ordinance. The letter gave plaintiffs until April 20, 1992 to cease and desist. Plaintiffs
refused to comply with the order and after numerous demands over the years, on November 13,
1997, defendant's attorney sent a letter to plaintiffs. The letter stated that unless they complied
within 14 days court action would be started to force compliance.
As a result of that letter this action was filed by plaintiffs and this trial ensued.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court rules as follows:
RULING
Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to continue the use they now make of the property,
which consists primarily of a storage yard for their trucks and trailers, through the operation of
estoppel, occasioned by defendants acts and omissions, as a non-conforming use under the
defendants' new zoning ordinance. Plaintiff also must prove the use of their land meets the legal
requirements to be considered a non-conforming use. Therefore, although both issues are
interrelated, the Court will address the estoppel issue first, as a determination in plaintiffs' favor
on the estoppel issue helps satisfy one of the elements required under non-conforming use.
ESTOPPEL
Current Utah law relating to zoning estoppel is primarily set forth in two opinions of the
Utah Supreme Court: Utah County v. Young. 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); and Western Land
Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). Peculiarly, although the two cases were
released only one month apart, there is no mention in either of the other, although the issues
discussed often overlap. Western Land, the latter of the two, discusses the law of zoning
5

estoppel as if no Utah court, let alone the very same court a mere one month prior, had ever
addressed the issue, citing case law from other jurisdictions in illustrating possible approaches to
the issue. The Western Land Court ultimately concludes that an application of zoning estoppel
would not be correct in that case, proceeding instead to analyze the case under a "vested right"
theory, certainly related, but not quite the same. The Court states:
In rejecting the zoning estoppel approach in this matter, we are not prepared
to state that it would never be relevant to a determination of the validity of a
retroactive application of a zoning ordinance. We are of the view, however, that the
relevant public and private interests are better accommodated in the first instance by
a different approach.
Western Land. 617 P.2d at 392-393. The Court then proceeds to discuss how and when property
owners' rights to a particular use might vest. In Western Land, the facts were that the owner had
purchased the land, and then, before any construction or other use of the property commenced,
the city amended its zoning ordinance, precluding the use for which the owner had intended for
the property. Rejecting a balancing-test type approach based on a weighing of the resources
which an owner has committed to a project against the possibility of other appropriate uses of the
land and the public welfare, the Court held that:
[A]n applicant is entitled to a building permit or subdivision approval if his proposed
development meets the zoning requirements in existence at the time of his
application and if he proceeds with reasonable diligence, absent a compelling,
countervailing public interest. Furthermore, if a city or county has initiated
proceedings to amend its zoning ordinances, a landowner who subsequently makes
application for a permit is not entitled to rely on the original zoning classification.
Id., at 396. It appears to the Court that the facts of Western Land do not fit well with the facts of
the present case. Here, there is no dispute that a permit was indeed issued, rather than simply
applied for, although the parties dispute that permit's relevance. Plaintiffs do not seek, in this
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action, a building permit at all, rather they seek a determination that the use they presently make
of their property is legally non-conforming under the current zoning ordinance. Furthermore, as
found by the Court, the property was used the same before the ordinance was changed as it is
presently. As stated above, and addressed more fully below, to be currently legal as nonconforming, it must have been allowable under the prior zoning ordinance. The case that is most
directly controlling with respect to that issue is Utah County v. Young {supra). There the
Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of estoppel in a zoning case. There was no
intervening zoning change, as there was in Western Land, and as there is in this case, yet the
intervening zoning change is only a secondary issue in this case if the Court finds the use legal
under the prior zoning law.
The facts of Young are essentially as follows: The landowners owned property zoned for
agricultural use only. They applied to the county for a building permit, for a "J"-type nonresidential, non-public use building, such that would include a barn. The permit was issued for
the construction of a barn, with an estimated value of $1,600. The landowners thereafter
proceeded to construct a building which, although resembling a barn, included an auction block,
bleachers, commercial plumbing and wiring, and which cost $23,000, and began operating a
livestock auction. The trial court found that at the time the landowners applied for their building
permit, and all through the intervening time until the county brought the action, the landowners
"knew that such a use would not be permitted under the zoning laws, and no agent or employee
of Utah County led them to believe otherwise." The trial court stated on the matter:
The only defense presented by the defendants was that they were entitled to
the application of equitable principles to prevent the county from enjoining his use
and operation of the land as a commercial 'Auction Barn' because of claimed
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misleading acts inducing his belief that on completion of the structure he would be
entitled to commercial use of it. The findings of the advisory jury, concurred in by
the Court, do not support any such misleading action, and to the contrary establish
that the defendants well-knew the zoning restrictions, and that they precluded
commercial use of the structure. Therefore, the rules of equity do not assist them in
their claim and the right of plaintiff to a permanent injunction prohibiting further
commercial use of the property is granted by the Court.
Young. 615 P.2d at 1266-67. The landowners claimed that even though they had knowledge of
the zoning laws, the alleged misleading actions of the building inspector should have entitled
them to an estoppel. On three grounds the Supreme Court ruled against the landowners. First,
the trial court found that there was no misleading by the county's agents. Second, the Supreme
Court stated:
[T]he structure, itself, which resembles a barn, does not violate the zoning laws; it
is only the commercial use thereof that is proscribed. Third, as a matter of law,
estoppel may not be used as defense by one,who has acted fraudulently, or in bad
faith, or with knowledge.
Id., at 1267. The Court goes on to establish the elements of a claim of estoppel in a zoning case
as follows:
To invoke the doctrine the county must have committed an act or omission upon
which the developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in
position or incurring extensive expenses. The action upon which the developer claims
reliance must be of a clear, definite and affirmative nature. If the claim be based on
an omission of the local zoning authority, omission means a negligent or culpable
omission where the party failing to act was under a duty to do so. Silence or inaction
will not operate to work an estoppel. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
landowner has a duty to inquire and confer with the local zoning authority regarding
the uses of the property that would be permitted.
Id., at 1267-68. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court's
judgment against the landowners.
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Here, the facts, as stated, supra, would show an entirely different scenario than those at
issue in Young. The property in question had been historically used, first in Davis County, and
later, after being annexed into defendant Woods Cross, for the parking of trucks, the same use for
which defendant seeks an injunction. It had been so used, on a continuous basis, known to both
Davis County and defendant, for at least 6 years prior to the time it was purchased by
plaintiffs. The surrounding property owners had made similar use of their (identically-zoned)
land. Defendants' mayor had induced the prior owners of plaintiffs' land to agree to the
annexation with the assurances that they could continue using the land in the manner which that
prior owner, and current plaintiffs, were using it. Plaintiffs went to defendant's offices and
reviewed the zoning ordinance, and reasonably believed (as set forth, infra) the use they wished
to put the land to would be allowed. After purchasing the land and continuing to use it as it had
been historically used, plaintiffs began to put fill on the land to make it more acceptable for the
parking of their trucks. Part of this fill came from the rotograding of defendant's streets, a fact
known to defendant.
They were then contacted by defendant and told that they needed to get a "fill permit"
before continuing to place the fill, but, significantly, they were not told that they could not park
their trucks on the land. Plaintiff Debbie Hugoe then went to the defendant's offices and
procured the "fill permit" from Tim Stephens, defendant's director of community development.
Mr. Stephens was fully aware that plaintiffs owned and operated a trucking company, that they
parked their trucks on the subject property, and that they were obtaining the fill permit to
improve the conditions on that property for such truck parking.
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There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Stephens told Ms. Hugoe that they
needed a site plan. Ms. Hugoe stated that there was no such mention. Mr. Stephens says he
can't remember, but he conveniently produced a memo to the file referring to a conversation
about the site plan.
The Court finds it inconsistent that an event that was so important that it triggered a
memo to the file would not have likewise triggered at least a notation or comment on the fill
permit. The fill permit was signed by Mr. Stephens on the same date as the file memo but is
silent on the issue. The comment portion is blank.
After obtaining the "fill permit," plaintiffs continued to place fill on the property,
eventually placing fill and performing grading, all with a value well over $100,000. It was only
as this work was being completed that defendant informed plaintiffs of the recent zoning change
that prohibited the use plaintiffs were making of their property. Defendants argue that no site
plan had been approved, no building permit issued, and that plaintiffs use therefore could not
have been "lawfully existing" prior to the zoning change. As support, they cite Western Land.
The Court finds little credence in their argument for several reasons. First, as set forth, supra,
Western Land is primarily concerned with the vesting of rights in instances where a zoning
changes before a use is made of a property, a scenario different than that before the Court.
Second, the "fill permit" issued by defendant was issued long after the current use was
made of the property, and was only obtained for leveling off and making the property more
serviceable under its current (and prior) use. Plaintiffs needed no building permit to use the land
in the manner in which it had always been used, in fact there were no "buildings" needed
whatsoever. As to defendant's argument that a "site plan" was needed to be legal, the Court
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cannot agree. The only thing that changed when ownership changed was the name and shape of
the trucks being parked on the land. There are no allegations that Davis County, the prior zoning
authority, had required a site plan and that there had been a failure to comply. There is no
evidence before the Court that the use had ever, prior to 1992, been questioned by any authority
as being anything but proper. Certainly defendants do not require a site plan every time a
business property is sold and new owners use the property for essentially the same purpose,
without major change. When minor changes are sought, a building permit, not a site plan, is
required. The language of the site plan ordinance is telling in this regard:
SITE PLAN. In any commercial or manufacturing zone, and in all zones where
construction of main buildings or dwellings other than single-family dwellings is
proposed or involved, the location of main and accessory buildings on the site and
in relation to one another, the traffic circulation features within the site, the height
and bulk of buildings, the provisions for off-street parking space, the provisions for
driveways for ingress and egress, and for the installation of curb, gutter and /or
sidewalk when not already in place along the street bordering, and provision for other
open space on the site, and the display of signs shall be in accordance with a site plan
or plans or subsequent amendment thereof, approved in any case by the Planning
Commission prior to the issuance of a Building or Land-Use permit. . .
(Section 11-18-9 of defendants' former City ordinances. This is the text submitted by defendant
as part of their reply memorandum to their motion for summary judgment.) It is clear that a site
plan is needed for construction purposes that change the character and use of the land, but not for
continued use of the land, by new owners, under a previously allowable use.
Third, and finally, even if the Court was to proceed under Western Land, it is undisputed
that plaintiff applied for, and obtained a "fill permit." The fill permit was granted with
defendant's knowledge that plaintiff was using the fill to be able to better park his trucks, a use
that had gone on for years prior. This Court can see no reason to limit the holding of Western
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Land to only building permits and subdivision approvals. Other types of permits may reference
the same type of rights, such as the liquor license in Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
Comm'n. 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). Defendant required plaintiffs to obtain a fill permit to place
fill, fill that plaintiffs felt was necessary to make better, but the same, use of their property. The
permit was obtained, and plaintiffs continued the same use thereafter. As plaintiffs actually
obtained the only type of "building permit" either party reasonably might argue was ever at issue
in this case, with the full knowledge of defendant that the prior use would be continued, Western
Land cannot but help plaintiffs' case, to the extent that it applies.
Reviewing the elements of estoppel set forth by Young, defendant must have:
L.

Committed an act or omission, and if an omission, it must be a negligent or

culpable omission, where the party failing to act was under a duty to do so.
The Court finds that Mr. Stephens, in first requiring and then issuing a fill permit to
plaintiffs, knowing full well the use to which the property was being put and would be put in the
future, without telling plaintiffs that there was any problem with that use, or noting the same on
the fill permit, constitutes a negligent omission by one who had a duty to act. Mr. Stephens'
omission was not mere silence or inaction, as may have been the case in Young. He had personal
knowledge of the use of the property, a use which had never been questioned by defendants, and
a use which could reasonably be allowed under the then current zoning ordinance. If he had
questions or believed that use to be improper, then was the time to speak, not after plaintiffs had
expended substantial resources.
2i

Good faith reliance on the act or omission in making substantial changes in

position or incurring extensive expenses.
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The Court finds that there is evidence only of good faith on the part of plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs had no knowledge that there was even a potential problem with their land use until
defendants informed them of the zoning change after significant resources had already been
committed to the fill project. The Court also rules that the expenses, with a value greater than
$100,000, outlaid by plaintiffs in such reliance were "extensive."
3,.

Duty to inquire and confer with the local zoning authority regarding the uses of

the property that would be permitted.
Plaintiff went to defendant's offices and reviewed the local zoning ordinance before
purchasing the property. The specific language of the zoning ordinance itself caused her to
reasonably believe that the use, a use to which the property had been put by the prior owners,
would be allowed. Knowing that the prior owners, as well as the surrounding property owners
used their identically zoned property in the same or similar manner, with defendant's
longstanding acquiescence, a review of the ordinance must have seemed nothing more than a
formality to plaintiffs.
The Court cannot envision how, under the facts of this case, plaintiffs would have had a
further duty to "inquire and confer" with the local zoning authority to be sure they could use the
property the same way it had been historically used, the same way surrounding property owners
used their property, especially in light of the zoning ordinance's seeming express approval of
such use.
The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs have met the elements required by Young to
estop defendant from arguing (or prosecuting plaintiff in a criminal or administrative case) that
plaintiffs' use of their property was not legally conforming to the prior zoning ordinance.
13

Legal Non-Conforming Use
To enable plaintiffs to prove they are entitled to continue their use, a use which is
indisputably not allowed as a conforming use under the current zoning ordinance, they must
show that it meets the requirement to be a non-conforming use under the applicable law. Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9-103(k) states:
(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that:
(I) legally existed before its current zoning designation;
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation
governing the land changed; and
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with the zoning
regulations that now govern the land.
The Court's finding as to the first element is set forth in the prior section, supra. As an
independent, but interrelated as it goes to the issue of plaintiffs' reasonable belief under estoppel,
grounds for finding the first element required for a non-conforming use, the Court sets forth the
following: Under the zoning ordinances in effect at the time plaintiffs purchased their property
and when they began their current use, their land was zoned "C-2." Permitted uses under C-2
include "transfer company." The parties are in disagreement as to the definition of a "transfer
company." The zoning ordinance itself provides no definition of "transfer company," neither is
it defined by Utah statutory or case law. The Court found one case, from Missouri, that
attempted to define its meaning. The court in Armco SteeL v. City of Kansas City. Missouri, 883
S.W.2d 3, 8-9 (Mo. 1994) states:
The term "transfer company" is defined as "a transportation company that transfers
passengers or baggage usually for a short distance between specified points or
terminals." Webster's Third International Dictionary (Unabridged) at 2427. In a
14
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broader sense used to describe certain litigants in Missouri case law, a transfer
company includes any company in the business of transporting freight or other
products for hire. See, e.g.. State ex rel. Beaufort Transfer Co.. 610 S.W.2d 96 (Mo.
App. 1980); Govreau v. Farmington Transfer Co.. 473 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. App. 1971);
Mason v. F.W. Strecker Transfer Co.. 409 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. 1966).
In Utah, there have been several cases dealing with "transfer companies." Sims v. Public
Service Commission 117 Utah 516; 218 P.2d 267 (Utah 1950) dealt with the "Salt Lake Transfer
Company" and its permit as a contract motor carrier to haul sugar for the "Utah-Idaho Sugar
Company" between West Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah. Murphy, dba Alex Pickering
Transfer Company, v. Public Service Commission. 514 P.2d 804 (Utah 1973) dealt with a permit
dispute against the Utah P.S.C. by a contract carrier. Ostler V. Albina Transfer Company. Inc..
781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) is a personal injury action discussing an accident involving a
"truck and semitrailer unit parked on the paved shoijlder of the roadway."
Plaintiff Hugoe Trucking, Inc. is a contract motor carrier licensed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the State of Utah. It is the Court's ruling that Hugoe Trucking is a
"transfer company" within the meaning of defendants' prior zoning ordinance. Defendants
would like to persuade the Court that the proper classification of plaintiffs' use of their property
is one found under zone "M-2," at (E), "Equipment yards, contractor's yard and storage."
Apparently this is as a result of Hugoe trucking's frequent work with contractors, hauling
construction materials. The only evidence before the Court is that plaintiff Hugoe Trucking is
not, and never has been, a contractor.
It is clear that under Utah law:
[Z]oning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's common-law right to
unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein restricting property uses
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should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses should be
liberally construed in favor of the property owner.
Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Plaintiff Hugoe Trucking is a trucking, and thus, "transfer" company. Nowhere in the prior
zoning ordinance is there a specific mention of any zone designated for "trucking company."
The only possibility is under "transfer company." The Court therefore finds that the use of
plaintiffs' property prior to the zoning change was "legally existing."
It has not been argued by the parties, and is thus apparently not at issue, but the Court
also finds that the use was "maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation
governing the land changed." There was a period of time when plaintiffs trucks were parked offsite to enable the filling and grading process, yet such would not constitute a "discontinuance."
The Court has been unable to find Utah case law on the issue, but a State of Washington case
dealing with discontinuance in a non-conforming use stated:
The mere temporary cessation of a nonconforming use, however, does not
effect abandonment or discontinuance of the nonconforming use. 8A E. McQuillin,
The Law of Municipal Corporations @ 25.196 (3d ed. rev. 1976).
Andrew v. King County. 586 P.2d 509, 513 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). Therefore, to the extent that
it is at issue, the Court rules that plaintiffs' use was "maintained continuously since the time the
zoning regulation governing the land changed."
The third element is not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the Court would find that
plaintiffs' current, and past, use of their property is a legal non-conforming use. As such, the
Court would find in favor of plaintiffs and enjoin any further action by defendant not consistent
with this ruling.
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Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to prepare findings and judgment in accordance with the
Court's Ruling and send a copy to opposing counsel at least 5 days before being submitted to the
Court for signature.
Dated May 1^,1998
BY THE COURT:

RODNEY SrRAGE
DISTRICT JUDGE
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAMON HUGOE, DEBBIE HUGOE, and
HUGOE TRUCKING INC., a Utah
corporation,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 960700425

WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal
corporation and political subdivision of the
State of Utah,

Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for trial to the Court on February 12, 1997. Plaintiffs were
represented by Gregory Simonsen and Bryan Booth of the law firm of Kirton & McConkie. The
defendant was represented by Michael Hayes and Todd Godfrey of the law firm of Mazuran &
Hayes. After the presentation of evidence and argument, the Court took the case under advisement

to prepare a written opinion. On May 19, 1998, the Court issued a Trial Ruling in favor of plaintiffs.
The Court now enters these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs' property and that of Mr. Richard Fleming lie adjacent to one another on the

south side of 500 South at approximately 1300 West in Woods Cross City, Davis County, Utah. The
street known as 500 South is a major East-West thoroughfare in the city.
2.

The legal description of Plaintiff s property is as follows:
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet
West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West 235.8 feet from the
Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; thence South 670.14
feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 feet along said street;
thence North 670.14 feet to the point of beginning.
AND
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet
West and North 0°26' West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West
105.8 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet;
thence South 670.14 feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65
feet along said street; thence North 670.14 feet to the point of
beginning.
ALSO:
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet
West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West 170.8 feet from the
Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; thence South 670.14
feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 feet along said street;
thence North 670.14 feet to the point of beginning.
ALSO:
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 660 feet
West from the Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North,
2

Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; and running thence North 330 feet;
thence West 72.8 feet; thence South 330 feet; thence East 72.8 feet to
the point of beginning.
Hereafter this parcel shall be referred to as "the property" or "plaintiffs' property."
3.

Both plaintiffs' parcel and Mr. Fleming's parcel were previously owned by Mr. Frank

Branch.
4.

In December of 1988 both parcels were annexed into Woods Cross City. Prior to

December 1988, the property was located in the unincorporated area of Davis County.
5.

Mr. Fleming purchased his parcel from Mr. Branch in 1985. Mr. Fleming obtained

permission from Davis County to place a culvert in front of his property to allow better access and to
haul in fill. Much of the fill was hauled onto the property from Davis County retention basins as a
result of the 1983 flooding.
6.

Mr. Fleming is in the construction business. Since he purchased the property in 1985,

he has used it continuously to park dump trucks, belly dumps, and various other pieces of heavy
equipment.
7.

Mr. Branch retained ownership of the parcel now owned by the plaintiff. Over the

years from at least 1985 until 1991, Mr. Branch allowed Mr. Clarence Newman to use the property.
Mr. Newman was in the insulation business and used the property to park semi-trucks and trailers
and large insulation trucks.

3

r?

8.

The use of the two parcels for truck and equipment parking was open and obvious and

clearly observable to anyone traveling on 500 South. The use continued from at least 1985 until
present.
9.

In the year leading up to annexation of the property into Woods Cross City, Mr.

Branch and Mr. Fleming had several conversations with the then Woods Cross City mayor, Mr.
Argyle, and attended several public meetings where they were encouraged to consent to annexation,
with the assurance that they would be able to continue the current use of their property. Ms. Debbie
Hugoe also attended some of these same meetings with her aunt who was a resident of the area.
10.

Prior to June 1991 plaintiffs became interested in purchasing the property, and Ms.

Hugoe went to the Woods Cross City offices to check the zoning of the property. She spoke with
Mr. Tim Stephens, the Community Development Director. He gave her a copy of the zoning
ordinance, which showed the property was in a C-2 zone. She noted that a permitted use in that zone
was a "transfer company."
11.

Ms. Hugoe told Mr. Stephens that she operated a trucking company. Trucks bearing

the Hugoe Trucking logo were often on the streets of Woods Cross City. Hugoe Trucking had been
used on several road construction jobs in the city hauling road base and "roto-mill" to and from the
road projects. Mr. Stephens was aware that the Hugoes were involved in a trucking business.
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12.

Ms. Hugoe inspected the property and the adjacent area and observed that the

property was being used for truck and equipment parking that seemed to be consistent with the
zoning use.
13.

Plaintiffs purchased the property on June 11, 1991 and immediately began parking

their trucks on their property.
14.

Shortly after purchase, plaintiffs began hauling fill onto the property, some of it from

projects they were working on in Woods Cross City. A Scott Anderson from the city informed Ms.
Hugoe that they needed a fill permit to place fill on the property.
15.

On August 12, 1991 Ms. Hugoe went to the Woods Cross City offices to obtain a fill

permit. She talked to Mr. Stephens about the permit. Mr. Stephens informed her that the city had
just adopted the fill ordinance and was still in the process of setting up policies and procedures. The
city had not yet designed a preprinted fill permit form, so Mr. Stephens used a preprinted building
permit form. Mr. Stephens and Ms. Hugoe discussed the type of fill plaintiffs were using and that
the fill was coming from city streets and other sources. He was aware that Ms. Hugoe's business,
Hugoe Trucking, Inc, was a trucking company.
16.

At trial there was conflicting evidence as to whether Mr. Stephens told Ms. Hugoe

that a site plan was required for the property. The court having weighed the credibility of the
witnesses and the evidence finds that Ms. Hugoe's testimony that no site plan was discussed is the
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most credible. Hence, the court finds that Mr. Stevens did not tell Ms. Hugoe of any site plan
requirement.
17.

The fill permit issued to Ms. Hugoe by Woods Cross City makes no mention of the

site plan requirement or any particular use, and the comment portion of the permit is blank. The fill
permit was signed by Mr. Stephens on August 13, 1991.
18.

Plaintiffs proceeded to complete the fill of their property by hauling in approximately

100 truck loads of fill which was topped by other materials to provide a smooth surface for the
parking of plaintiffs' trucks. The value of the fill and the work performed to grade it and finish it
was over $100,000.
19.

The filling of the property was completed by Spring of 1992. At all times after their

purchase of the property, plaintiffs continued to park trucks on their property. When the fill
operation temporarily required them to move their trucks, plaintiffs parked their trucks on the
neighboring Fleming property.
20.

The plaintiffs' use of the property to park trucks was consistent with other property

uses in the area. Use of the property in the area for commercial and industrial purposes has changed
very little over the years.
21.

In the early part of 1992, Woods Cross City adopted a new zoning ordinance which

changed the zoning on plaintiffs' property and other property in the area to 1-1, light industrial.
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22.

On March 27, 1992, plaintiffs received a letter from Woods Cross City informing

plaintiffs for the first time that the use of their property for parking trucks was in violation of the new
zoning ordinance. The letter gave plaintiffs until April 20, 1992 to cease and desist. Plaintiffs
refused to comply with the order, and after numerous demands over the years, defendant's attorney
sent a letter to plaintiffs on November 13, 1997. The letter stated that if plaintiffs did not comply
within 14 days, court action would be initiated to force compliance.
23.

As a result of that letter this action was filed by the plaintiffs and this trial ensued.

From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following conclusions of law.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court finds that the plaintiffs have established the elements for zoning estoppel

set forth in Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980).
2.

The Court finds that Mr. Stephens' actions in first requiring and then issuing a fill

permit to plaintiffs, knowing full well the use to which the property was being put and would be put
in the future, without telling plaintiffs that there was any problem with that use, or noting the same
on the fill permit, constitute a negligent omission by one who had a duty to act. Mr. Stephens'
omission was not mere silence or inaction, as may have been the case in Young. He had personal
knowledge of the use of the property, a use which had never been questioned by defendant, and a use
which could reasonably be allowed under the then current zoning ordinance. If he had questions or
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believed that use to be improper, then was the time to speak, not after plaintiffs had expended
substantial resources.
3.

The Court also concludes that there is evidence only of good faith on the part of the

plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had no knowledge that there was even a potential problem with their land use
until defendant informed them of the zoning change after significant resources had already been
committed to the fill project. The Court also rules that the expenses, with a value greater than
$100,000, outlaid by plaintiffs in such reliance were "extensive."
4.

The court also finds that plaintiffs inquired and consulted zoning authorities and

reviewed zoning ordinances regarding use of the property. Ms. Hugoe went to defendant's offices
and reviewed the local zoning ordinance before purchasing the property. The specific language of
the zoning ordinance itself caused her to reasonably believe that the use, a use to which the property
had been put by the prior owners, would be allowed. Knowing that the prior owners, as well as the
surrounding property owners, used their identically zoned property in the same or similar manner,
with defendant's longstanding acquiescence, a review of the ordinance must have seemed nothing
more than a formality to plaintiffs.
5.

The Court cannot envision how, under the facts of this case, plaintiffs would have had

a further duty to "inquire and confer" with the local zoning authority to be sure they could use the
property the same way it had been historically used and the same way surrounding property owners
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used their property, especially in light of the zoning ordinance's seemingly express approval of such
use.
6.

The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs have met the elements required by Young to

estop defendant from arguing in this action (or any criminal or administrative action) that plaintiffs'
use of their property was not legally conforming to the prior zoning ordinance.
7.

The Court finds that plaintiffs have met the requirements to establish a valid pre-

existing nonconforming use.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 10-9-103(k) states:

(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that:
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation;
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation
governing the land changed; and
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with the zoning
regulations that now govern the land.
8.

The Court's conclusion that the use legally existed before the current zoning is set

forth in the prior section. As an independent, but interrelated, grounds for finding the first element
required for a non-conforming use, the Court sets forth the following: Under the zoning ordinances
in effect at the time plaintiffs purchased their property and began their current use, the property was
zoned "C-2." Permitted uses under C-2 include "transfer company." It is the Court's ruling that
Hugoe Trucking is a "transfer company" within the meaning of defendant's prior zoning ordinance
and that Hugoe Trucking's use of the property was and is consistent with this designation.
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9.

It has not been argued by the parties, and is thus apparently not at issue, but the Court

also finds that the use of the property was "maintained continuously since the time the zoning
regulation governing the land changed." There was a period of time when plaintiffs trucks were
parked off-site to enable the filling and grading process, yet such would not constitute a
"discontinuance." Therefore, to the extent that it is at issue, the Court rules that plaintiffs' use was
"maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation governing the land changed."
10.

The third element is not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the Court would find that

plaintiffs' current, and past, use of their property to park trucks in conjunction with their trucking
business is a legal, non-conforming use.
III. JUDGMENT
The Court hereby enters judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The Court rules that plaintiffs fall
within the definition of a "transfer company" under the C-2 zoning in effect at the time plaintiffs
purchased the property. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to continue to use their property in a manner
consistent with this designation, including storing and parking trucks in conjunction with plaintiffs'
business. The Court permanently enjoins defendant from taking any action to prohibit or prevent
plaintiffs from using the property in this manner. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover costs pursuant to
applicable court rules.
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DATED this J E ^ day of

QM<U/&,

, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

Hc£(LiM J- -bL
r

Rodney S.J.fcfe
District Judge
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foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be mailed through United
States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Michael Z. Hayes
Todd J. Godfrey
Mazuran & Hayes
2118 East 3900 South, Suite B300
Salt Lake City, UT 84124
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Gregory M. Simonsen (#4669)
Clark B. Fetzer (#1069)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAMON HUGOE, DEBBIE HUGOE, and
HUGOE TRUCKING INC , a Utah
corporation,

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND
DECLARATORY RELIEF

Plaintiffs,

C i v U N o / l ^ O ^ C V '

vs.
Judge

£ ^ p

WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal
corporation and political subdivision of the
State of Utah,
pp"-

Defendant.

Plaintiffs, Damon Hugoe, Debbie Hugoe and Hugoe Trucking, Inc , hereby complain and
allege of defendant Woods Cross City as follows:
PARTIES
1.

Plaintiffs Damon Hugoe and Debbie Hugoe are husband and wife, residing in West

Bountiful, Davis County, Utah.

2.

Plaintiff Hugoe Trucking, Inc., is a Utah corporation, with its principal place of

business in Woods Cross, Davis County, Utah. Hugoe Trucking, Inc., is owned by Damon Hugoe
and Debbie Hugoe. Hugoe Trucking, Inc., is a small trucking company engaged in the business of
transporting rock products and rock aggregates.
3.

Defendant Woods Cross City is a municipality incorporated under the laws of the

State of Utah and as such is a political subdivision of the State of Utah.
4.

This court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to §§ 78-3-4 and 78-33-1 of the

Utah Code. Venue is proper before this court pursuant to §§ 78-13-1 and 78-13-7 of the Utah Code.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
5.

On or about June 12, 1991, Damon Hugoe and Debbie Hugoe purchased property

located in Woods Cross City, Davis County, Utah, more fully described as follows:
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet
West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West 235.8 feet from the
Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; thence South 670.14
feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 feet along said street;
thence North 670.14 feet to the point of beginning.
AND
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet
West and North 0°26' West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West
105.8 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet;
thence South 670.14 feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65
feet along said street; thence North 670.14 feet to the point of
beginning.
ALSO:
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet
West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West 170.8 feet from the
Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; thence South 670.14
feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 feet along said street;
thence North 670.14 feet to the point of beginning.
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ALSO:
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 660 feet
West from the Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; and running thence North 330 feet;
thence West 72.8 feet; thence South 330 feet; thence East 72.8 feet to
the point of beginning.
6.

Prior to the time the Hugoes purchased the subject property, it was used for an

extended period for the storage of large mobile storage containers. Woods Cross City never
challenged the property use under the prior owner.
7.

The Hugoes purchased the subject property for the primary purpose of having a place

for their business, Hugoe Trucking, Inc., to park trucks after hours.
8.

When the Hugoes purchased the property, the property was zoned pursuant to

Chapter 13 (Commercial Zone C-2) of the Woods Cross City ordinances. Permitted uses in the
Commercial Zone C-2 included but were not limited to uses such as transfer companies, trailer sales,
automobile sales and rental agencies, public garages (including automobile repair, and body and
fender work and painting), police or fire stations, tire shops, and accessory uses and buildings
customarily incidental to all such permitted uses. Conditional uses included parking lots incidental to
authorized commercial uses, storage buildings and mini-warehouses, service stations and fuel sales
offices, and trailer camps for trailers and mobile homes mounted on wheels for ready movement or
transport.
9.

In August of 1991, the Hugoes applied for a construction permit from Woods Cross

City. The permit was to bring fill onto the property, to level the property to enable the Hugoes to
park their trucks on the property. At the time the Hugoes applied for the permit, Woods Cross City
clearly knew and understood that the purpose of the fill permit was to level the property so that
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Hugoe Trucking, Inc., could park its trucks on the property and use it as a yard for their trucking
operations. With full knowledge of the intended purpose for the fill, on August 14, 1991, Woods
Cross City issued construction permit no 1207 permitting Hugoe to improve its property for the
parking of its trucks.
10.

Relying upon the zoning ordinance and upon the fill permit, Hugoe Trucking invested

significant sums of money in the subject property to make it suitable for parking trucks. Hugoe
Trucking has used the subject property continuously for parking its trucks since the issuance of the fill
permit in August of 1991.
11.

In 1992, Woods Cross City enacted changes to its zoning ordinances Among the

changes, Woods Cross changed the zoning of the area where the Hugoes owned their property to
Zone I-l. The new I-l zoning appears to prohibit the Hugoes from using the property to park trucks
and related equipment.
12.

From the time of the enactment of the new zoning ordinance until August of 1995,

Hugoe Trucking continued to use the subject property for parking its trucks. In August of 1995, the
City of Woods Cross issued a criminal information against Hugoe Trucking and Debbie Hugoe as its
agent for violation of the new Woods Cross Zoning ordinance. The City claims that plaintiffs have
committed a Class B misdemeanor by parking their equipment on the property. A true and correct
copy of the information is attached hereto as exhibit "A".
13.

The purpose .of the City's action is not only to punish Hugoe Trucking and Debbie

Hugoe for an alleged criminal violation but also for the purpose of compelling Hugoe Trucking to no
longer park its trucks upon the property. A trial on the misdemeanor charge is scheduled for January
2, 1997, at 6:30 p.m., before the Woods Cross City Justice Court.
4

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Relief)
14.

The allegations of the previous paragraphs are hereby incorporated in this cause of

15.

Pursuant to Utah case law and statutes, including but not limited to § 10-9-408 of the

action.

Utah Code and §§ 12-22-102 and 12-22-103 of the Woods Cross City ordinances, the plaintiffs have
a vested right in a non-conforming use upon the subject property. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are
entitled to continue to use their property for the purpose of parking trucks and equipment incidental
thereto and for all other purposes that were proper prior to the zoning change.
16.

A prosecution and conviction under the new zoning ordinances would force the

plaintiffs to stop parking its trucks on the property. Such a prosecution and conviction would
constitute an unconstitutional taking of the property-in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution.
17.

This Court should issue a declaratory judgment that the subject property carries with it

a vested right to carry on the non-conforming use notwithstanding the 1992 zoning change and
notwithstanding the efforts of Woods Cross City to criminally prosecute the plaintiffs for violation of
the new zoning ordinance.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Injunctive Relief)
18.

The allegations of the previous paragraphs are hereby incorporated in this cause of

action.
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19.

The plaintiffs, and each of them, will be seriously and irreparably harmed if Woods

Cross City is allowed to go forward with its criminal prosecution for violation of the current zoning
ordinance. The serious and irreparable harm that would come to the plaintiffs outweighs any benefit
that Woods Cross City would obtain in stopping the plaintiffs from parking their trucks on the subject
property during the pendency of this action.
20.

If Woods Cross City is allowed to go forward with the criminal prosecution for

violation of the new zoning ordinance, plaintiffs will be compelled to close their business, inasmuch as
they have no other facility to park their trucks and to dispatch their trucks. The plaintiffs will suffer
further irreparable damage inasmuch as they will be unable to fulfill existing contracts with third
parties. Overall, it is likely that the plaintiffs would be forced to close, never again to be reopened.
21.

This Court should first issue a preliminary injunction, preventing the criminal

prosecution of the plaintiffs under the new zoning ordinance during the pendency of this action. Such
an injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. At the trial of this case, this Court should
issue a permanent injunction preventing the City from prosecuting the plaintiffs under the new zoning
ordinance. The City should be further enjoined from in any way inhibiting the plaintiffs from parking
their trucks or related equipment on the subject property.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court grant equitable relief as follows:
1. A declaratory judgment that the plaintiffs have a vested right to a non-conforming use on
the subject property to continue to use the property for parking trucks and other equipment
associated with the business.
2. The court should issue a preliminary and then permanent injunction preventing Woods
Cross City from prosecuting the plaintiffs under the new zoning ordinance, or in any way preventing
6

the plaintiffs from the lawful use of their property in parking trucks and other vehicles associated with
the business.
3. For such other and further equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper
DATED this 31 day of December, 1996.
KIRTON & McCONKIE
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CHAPTER 13
COMMERCIAL ZONE C-2
Il4l2yi:

Use Regulations

11-13-2:

Special Provisions

11-13-3:

Area and Frontage Regulations

11-13-4:

Yard Regulations

11-13-5:

Height Regulations

11-13-6:

Coverage Regulations

11-13-7:

Fencing

11-13-8:

Bond

11-13-1:
USB REGULATIONS. In Commercial Zone C-2, no building or land shall
be used, and no building shall be erected which is arranged, intended or
designed to be used for other than one or more of the following uses:
(A) PERMITTED USES.
(1) Any permitted use allowed in Commercial Zone C-l.
(2) Apartment hotel; apartment motel.
^^3) Automobile and trailer sales.
^11^(4) Awning sales and repair.
(5) Automobile rental agency.
(6) Baths.
(7) Bird store.
(8) Blueprinting or photostating.
(9) Bus depot.
(10) Business college or private school operated as a
commercial enterprise.
(11) Cleaning establishment.
(12) Department store.
(13) Dressmaking shop for retail sales at said shop.
(14) Electrical and heating equipment.
(15) Employment agency.
(16) Film exchange.
(17) Fix-it shop.
(18) Flooring or floor repair shop.
(19) Fur sales, storage and/or repair.
(20) Furniture store.
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(21) Greenhouse and/or nursery; plant materials, soil and lawn
service, provided that all incidental equipment and
supplies, including fertilizer and empty cans, etc. are
kept within a building.
(22) Hospitals (except animal) or sanitariums.
(23) Hotel.
,
(24) Ice storage, and retail and wholesale ice stores.
(25) Laundry.
26) Lodge.
'(27) Manufacture of goods to be sold at retail on the premises.
(28) Medical or dental laboratories.
(29) Music conservatory; music instruction.
(30) Mortuary.
(31) Pet shop or taxidermist.
(32) Plumbing or sheet metal supply shop if conducted wholly
within a completely enclosed building.
Printing, lithography or publishing.
Public garage, including automobile repairing and
incidental body and fender work, painting and upholstering
if all operations are conducted wholly within a completely
enclosed building.
(35) Police or fire station.
(36) Public services, excepting electric distributing station.
(37) Rescue mission.
(38) Retail stores or businesses.
(39) Second hand store, if conducted wholly within a completely
enclosed building.
(40) Sign manufacturing shops, including neon, if conducted
wholly within a completely enclosed building.
(41) Studios (except motion picture).
(42) Telephone exchange.
(43) Tire shop operated wholly within a building.
(44) Travel bureau.
(45) Transfer company.
(46) Upholstering shop, if conducted wholly within a completely
enclosed building.
(47) Wedding chapel.
(48) Wholesale merchandise broker, excluding wholesale storage.
(49) Accessory uses and buildings customarily incidental to the
above.

J

J

(B)

CONDITIONAL USES.:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Any conditional use permitted in Commercial Zone C-l.
Amusement enterprises, including a billiard or pool hall,
bowling alley, dance hall, or theater auditorium.
Boxing arena.
Coal and fuel sales office.
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(5) Circus or amusement enterprise of similar type, transient
in character.
(6) Electric substation.
(7) Games of skill and science.
(8) Monument works, retail.
Penny «rcade.
____^
tO}JPlaDDJPg '^jj srcd cabinet shopT>
[Tl)Pony riding~ring, without stables.
(12) Shooting gallery.
(13) Small animal hospital.
(14) Storage building for household goods and equipment;
mini-warehouses.
(15) Taverns; night clubs; beer parlors.
(16) Temporary revival church.
(17) Trade school, if not objectionable due to noise, odor,
vibration, etc.
(18.) Trailer camps for trailers and mobile homes mounted on
wheels for ready movement or transport.
(191) Veterinary.
11-13-2
SPECIAL PROVISIONS. The above specified stores, shops or businesses
shall be retail establishments and shall be permitted only under the following
conditions:
(A) Such businesses shall be conducted wholly within an enclosed 4r
building, or on a lot which is enclosed by a solid wall, board
fence or evergreen hedge not less than 6 feet in height, except
for the sale of gasoline and oil by service stations, the
parking of automobiles, and service to persons in automobiles.
(B) All products produced, whether primary or incidental, shall be
sold at retail on the premises; and no entertainment, except
music, shall be permitted in cafes, confectioneries, or
refreshment stands(C) Any exterior sign display shall pertain only to a use conducted
within the building or lot or shall appertain to the lease or
the sale of the property; such sign shall be attached flat
against the wall of the building parallel to its horizontal
dimension and shall not exceed 100 square feet in area. One
such sign only may be permitted on each wall facing on a
street.. In no case shall nay such sign employ animation or
flashing lights and shall not project above the height of the
building more than 36 inches.
11-13-3:
AREA AND FRONTAGE REGULATIONS. None, except off-street parking,
loading, and unloading spaces, in accordance with Chapter 19, Title XI, of
these Revised Ordinances.

T-ll Ch-13 Page 3

Printed: 07/30/1986

11-13-4

YARD REGULATIONS.
(A) Side Yards. For main buildings other than dwellings, none
except that wherever a building is built upon a lot adjacent to
a residential or agricultural zone boundary, there shall be
provided a side yard of not less than 10 feet on the side of
the building adjacent to the boundary line, and on corner lots
the side yard which faces on the street shall be not less than
30 feet. Accessory dwelling units where windows of such
dwelling are provided adjacent to any side lot line, such
dwellings shall be provided with a side yard of not less than
10 feet.
(B)

Front Yard. The minimum depth of the front yard for all
buildings shall be not less than 20 feet; provided, however,
that the Planning Commission, as a Conditional Use and after
consideration of the location of the proposed building, the
shape and size of the lot or area upon which said building
would be located, the uses being made of adjoining and nearby
properties and the building setback thereon, the landscaping
desired thereon, and such other conditions, elements and
circumstances as the Planning Commission shall consider
appropriate and relevant, may approve a lesser setback not to
exceed a variance of more than 50 percent from the setback
distance herein set forth. The Planning Commission may also
approve an awning, canopy, porch or other structure attached to
any such building in the front yard thereof extending to a
point, including roof overhang, not closer than one foot from
the street line, subject to the considerations herein mentioned
and to the further consideration that prior to approval, the
Planning Commission shall determine that the proposed awning,
canopy, porch or other attachment to such building shall not
unreasonably restrict visibility or sight clearance across the
major portion of the front yard required by this Section or as
otherwise modified by the Planning Commission in accordance
with the provisions and requirements hereof. All billboards
and other signs having less than 10 feet clearance between the
ground and sign shall be required to have the same front yard
as is required of buildings and other structures.

(C) Rear Yard. The minimum rear yard for all buildings shall be 15*
feet.
^^
11-13-5
HEIGHT REGULATIONS. The maximum permitted height of buildings shall
not exceed two and one-half stories of 35 feet, provided that the Planning
Commission, as a Conditional Use and after consideration of the location of the
proposed building, the plans for incorporation of an approved fire protection
•Amended 11-13-4(B) - Ordinance #231

4/6/82
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sprinkling system therein, the shape and size of the lot or area
said building would be located, the uses being made of adjoining
properties and such other conditions, elements and circumstances
Planning Commission shall consider appropriate and relevant, may
greater height or greater number of stories in said building.

upon which
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as the
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11-13-6:
COVERAGE REGULATIONS, No building or structure or group of
buildings, with their accessory buildings, shall cover more than 60 percent of
the area of the lot.
11-13-7
FENCING. On lots containing mainbuild^ags other than single-family
dwellings fences may-i>e-j^quired along the sjjdfeand/or rear lot lines by the
Planning Commission. Howevfei%for topo^pa^hical, architectural, structures or
other reasons, fencing may be watvcrf^n whole or in part. Where fences are
required by the Planning CooBissipxiTthe^shall be either the solid or open
mesh type with a minimum heighjKof 4 feetand^a maximum height of 6 feet.
Fences along the side lot Lilies shall extend fro&K^ny required front yard
setback to the rear of tt*e lot, but fences may be constructed along the side
lot lines in the fronj^yard not to exceed 2 feet in height if the solid type or
4 feet if the open^mesh type.
11-13-8:
BOND. A corporate surety or cash bond, or letter of credit from a
land title company licensed to do business in the State of Utah, or from a
bank, savings and loan association or other financially responsible lending
institution, in an amount equal to 2 percent of the construction costs of each
and every principal building constructed on the lot, other than a single-family
dwelling, shall be required to guarantee the completion of all site
development, including, among other things, the landscaping, sprinkling
systems, driveways, parking areas, sidewalks and curb and gutter; provided,
however, that the City Council, after recommendation by the Planning
Commission, may accept other security sufficient to guarantee such
installation.
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11-18-9:
SITE PLAN* * n Qny commercial or manufacturing zone, and in all
zones where construction of main buildings or dwellings other than
single-family dwellings is proposed or involved, the location of main and
accessory buildings $on the site and in relation to one another, the traffic
circulation features within the site, the height and bulk of buildings, the
provision for off-street parking space, the provision for driveways for ingress
and egress, and for the installation of curb, gutter and/or sidewalk when not
already in place along the street bordering, and provision for other open space
on the site, and the display of signs shall be in accordance with a site plan
or plans or subsequent amendment thereof, approved in any case by the Planning
Commission prior to issuance of a Building or Land-Use Permit. In approving
site plans the Planning Commission may act on a site plan submitted to it or
may act on its own initiative in proposing and approving a site plan, including
any conditions or requirements designated or specified on or in connection
therewith. A site plan shall include landscaping, fences, and walls designed
to further the purposes of the regulations for commercial, industrial, and
residential zones with two or more family dwelling units and such features
shall be provided and maintained as a condition of the establishment and
maintenance of any use to which they are appurtenan&2* In considering any site
plan hereunder the Planning Commission shall endeavor to assure safety and
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convenience of traffic movements both within the area covered and in relation
to access streets, harmonious and beneficial relation among the buildings and
uses in the area covered, and satisfactory and harmonious relation between such
area and contiguous land and buildings and adjacent neighborhoods.
All persons required to file a site plan under the provisions of this Section
shall, at the time of the filing thereof, pay to the City a fee of $10.00 per
acre, or any portion thereof, contained within the area covered by the site
plan, with a minimum fee of $25.00, the same to cover part of the cost of
processing and reviewing said site plan; provided, however, that said fee may
be changed from time to time by Resolution of the City Council.

•Amended 11-18-9 - Ordinance #257 8/21/84
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